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Diversity and Development: Policy Entrepreneurship of
Euroregional Initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe
Gergő Medve-Bálint* and Sara Svensson
Abstract
The article builds on the authors’ research into the formation of Euroregions in Central and Eastern Europe,
addressing questions that may also be relevant on a broader European scale. Based on our empirical ﬁndings, in
previous research we demonstrated why some local governments join Euroregions while others abstain. This
article takes a further step and aims to discuss what happens once local governments become involved in them.
How do motivations and expectations of local governments, as well as the power asymmetries between them,
determine the capacity of these small-scale local cross-border collaborative initiatives to act as policy
entrepreneurs? We take the three different Euroregional initiatives present in the Komárom–Esztergom region at
the Hungarian–Slovakian border as illustrative examples. The empirical data were collected through personal
interviews with the representatives of the Euroregions and with the highest political representatives of all local
governments that are members on the Hungarian side. We ﬁnd that differences in membership structure and in
the motivational background inﬂuence their capacity to act as policy entrepreneurs operationalized as
organizational development, diversiﬁcation of resource base and appropriation of cross-border cooperation
activities. We thus rely on a modiﬁed version of Markus Perkmann’s theoretical framework built around the
concept of policy entrepreneurship, but apply it to cases where we are able to control for variations in underlying
macro-level conditions, such as politico-administrative or ethno-linguistic settings. The paper, therefore,
highlights the differences in the internal dynamics of these initiatives and also challenges the perception of
Euroregions as homogeneous institutions.
Introduction
After the collapse of the communist regimes Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has witnessed a
remarkably quick proliferation of local cross-border initiatives in the form of Euroregions. While this
trend was noted early on also in the pages of this journal (starting with Scott and Collins 1997),1 we have
only recently begun to understand its scope and relevance (e.g. Popescu 2008; Johnson 2009; Kaiser,
Zimin, and Herrschel 2011; Medve-Bálint 2013; for earlier works, see Keating 2003 or Turnock 2002).
The current article seeks to contribute to this specialized literature on CEE but also to the broader
literature on European cross-border regionalism (e.g. Deas and Lord 2006; Smith 2004; Perkmann 2003,
2007a, 2007b; Jessop 2002) in two ways. First, we aim to establish whether there is convergence or
divergence in terms of how these Euroregions operate. Second, we address the question of which factors
inﬂuence their organizational development and capacity to act as policy entrepreneurs. Before discussing
our methodology and the structure of the paper, we will brieﬂy comment on each of these two questions.
For our purpose we deﬁne a Euroregion as a formalized cooperation between subnational authorities,
often including private and non-proﬁt actors, located close to a border in two or more countries.2
The introduction and promotion of legal tools, such as the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation
(EGTC) and the European Euroregional Co-operation Grouping (ECG), established by the European
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Union and the Council of Europe respectively, seem to push Euroregions towards more similarity.
Whereas the regulations of the funding period for 2007–2013 stipulated that member states “may make
use” of the EGTCs for management and implementation of EU funds for cross-border cooperation
(European Commission 2006, article 18), the proposed regulation for the 2014–2020 period states that
these institutions “should, where appropriate” be involved (European Commission 2011, 10, our italics).
According to Celata and Coletti (2011), who have analyzed a number of relevant policy documents, the
European Union has consistently viewed the delimitation and “the deﬁnition of border regions as
unproblematic, self-evident and guided by objective criteria ” (Celata and Coletti 2008, 8).3 Indeed, the
EU seems to indirectly push for a greater standardization of local cross-border initiatives by introducing
legal tools like the EGTC, which also bears potential ﬁnancial rewards in that it may grant easier access to
EU funds for the EGTC members. This policy practice is in contrast with ﬁndings of earlier research that
demonstrate signiﬁcant variation in the set-up and function of Euroregions across Europe (Perkmann
2007a).
Through the example of three Euroregions at the Hungarian–Slovak border, we argue that in spite of these
implicit top-down standardization attempts, institutional convergence is not taking place or, at best, it is
highly limited. By examining Euroregions within a single NUTS 3 region,4 we control for several factors
(like local policy problems, linguistic and ethnic particularities and the availability of external ﬁnancial
resources), which may explain variance between Euroregions established in geographically, historically and
culturally unrelated regions.
The paper builds on a previous study of the authors which addressed the question of why local
governments join or do not join Euroregions in CEE (Medve-Bálint and Svensson 2012). In this current
work we take a further step and seek to explore what happens to the Euroregions once local governments
join them. We evaluate which factors inﬂuence the organizational paths of Euroregions and how the
differences in their membership structure (internal power relations) and in the members’ motivational
background affect their capacity in terms of policy entrepreneurship. We thus rely on a modiﬁed version
of Perkmann’s theoretical framework built around this concept (Perkmann 2007b), but apply it to cases
where we are able to control for variations in underlying macro-level conditions, such as politico-
administrative or ethno-linguistic settings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section we set the ground for the analysis by deﬁning key
concepts and outline the methodology used to answer the research questions. The third section brieﬂy
discusses the historical background and core attributes of the selected border region and introduces the
three Euroregions present there. In the fourth section we analyze the factors at play based on the
comparison of the three cross-border initiatives. The ﬁnal section concludes and outlines the potentials for
further research in this topic.
Why Do Local Governments Join Euroregions and What Happens After?
How Euroregions emerge and what factors determine their development constitute questions that
still lack persuasive answers. This ﬁeld of inquiry is especially relevant for Central and Eastern
Europe where borders have long been contested along cultural, ethnic, political, and economic lines
(Balcsók, Dancs, and Koncz 2005; Hardi & Mezei 2003; Hardi 2007; van Houtum & Scott 2005;
Eriksonas 2006). Moreover, after World War II, until the collapse of the communist regimes,
borders posed almost impermeable barriers to cross-border exchange (Kennard 2004; Turnock
2002). This resulted in economic decline and led to the marginalization of many CEE border
regions (Turnock 2002; Mezei 2004). In addition, the decades of isolation also indirectly reinforced
existing fears and stereotypes towards ethnically different inhabitants living across the border (Yoder
2003). In spite of these factors, the number of Euroregions, understood as organizations rather
than as territories, rose rapidly across CEE and now they are present everywhere along the state
borders.
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In this section we elaborate on the emergence issue by restating our previous research, and then continue
to our argument that policy entrepreneurship, as interpreted by Perkmann (2007b), is a useful concept to
capture variations in the development of Euroregions after they are established.
The ability of Euroregions in CEE to attract local governments varies to a great extent (Medve-Bálint
2013). In previous work (Medve-Bálint and Svensson 2012) we elaborated on why this is the case—why
do some local governments in border regions join Euroregions while others abstain? Based on a case study
on the Komárom–Esztergom border region in Hungary, we found that both instrumental and normative
factors play a role in determining local government membership in Euroregions. Regarding the
instrumental factors, besides the availability of external funding for cross-border cooperation, the
administrative embeddedness of local governments also matters. This aspect means that groups of local
governments belonging to a single administrative sub-regional unit (for instance a micro-region) are more
likely to enter a Euroregional initiative together as they are able to solve collective action problems within
the micro-regional framework. Furthermore, converging project plans of local governments also pose a
signiﬁcant incentive to join, while conﬂicting plans appear as serious obstacles. Concerning the normative
factors, a common ethnic background of the inhabitants across the border and the presence of strong
historical socio-economic and cultural ties facilitate local government membership in Euroregions.
However, contrary to expectations, our research could not verify that support for ethnic cohesion shared
among the local political elites would determine membership as such attitudes could just as well be
channeled through other institutions like bilateral partnerships. Cognitive distance, which does not
necessarily correspond to physical distance from the border, is another key normative element. The
perception of how “close” the border is and the signiﬁcance that is attributed to cross-border cooperation
varies by local government and this variation cannot be fully explained by the geographic distance from the
state border. It is important to note that the above factors jointly determine local government membership
and, as such, the territorial coverage of Euroregions. In short, instrumental and normative factors affect
Euroregion membership in conjunction with each other.
After having identiﬁed the reasons why local governments tend to join Euroregions, the next question is
what happens to these initiatives once they are established? Following Perkmann (2007b), we use the
concept of “policy entrepreneur” (Mintrom 1997) not in relation to individual actors but to organizations,
as an analytic lens “to assess the degree to which Euroregions represent actual actors able to shape their
environment” (Perkmann 2007b, 862). In his use of “policy entrepreneurship,” Perkmann emphasizes
resource mobilization, which is in line with the standpoint we have taken throughout our current and
previous research.
As with any other organisation, once a Euroregion is established as such, it will
operate to secure organisational survival (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). This will occur
within the constraints and opportunities afforded by the organisation’s ability to
mobilise resources and the specialist competencies it will be able to build up over
time. Though mostly applied to social movements, resource mobilisation theory can
thus be used to inform an operational framework to assess the success of Euroregions.
In particular, it refers to the ability of these organisations to create and maintain a
support base on a local level; in most cases, this will involve maintaining networks of
local authorities as paying members. (Perkmann 2007b, 867)
In order to investigate if and how the capacity of Euroregions to act as policy entrepreneurs differs and
what may affect such differences, we conducted an in-depth study of the Komárom–Esztergom NUTS 3
region in Hungary. We selected this region because three Euroregions are present there within a relatively
small area, thus we held most external factors constant that could inﬂuence the differences. There is an
abundance of micro-level case studies of Eastern European Euroregions or cross-border regions that
usually focus on “key stakeholders,” such as representatives of organizations, regional administrative and/
or political bodies and major urban centers (e.g. Haase and Wust 2004; Eskelinen and Kotilainen 2005;
Grix and Knowles 2003; Knippschild 2008). Unlike these works, we argue that it is important to put
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more emphasis on the political membership of Euroregions, including those representing smaller
settlements, in order to gain a better insight into the mechanisms driving cross-border cooperation at the
local level. Hence, besides using secondary literature, we base our analysis on a virtually complete set of
interviews with the members of the Euroregions in the selected area.
We interviewed the highest political representatives, the mayors of all but one of the local governments
that are Euroregion members on the Hungarian side and we also talked to current and past Euroregion
leaders and managers. Altogether, we carried out 31 interviews, out of which 22 were conducted in person
and 9 over the phone. The semi-structured interviews with mayors took place at the seats of the local
governments and generally lasted between 45 and 75 minutes. In two cases high-level administrative
ofﬁcials received us, but the mayors subsequently approved their answers. All the interviews, except one,
were carried out during the spring and summer of 2010 (see the full list in the Appendix).
The collected information allows for an informed comparison of the three Euroregions. It can be noted
that the study responds to Perkmann’s call in another recent article for more comparative work that
“explore degrees of empirical variation” (Perkmann 2007a, 257) along such dimensions as political
mobilization and governance, in order to shed light on how processes of re-scaling occur. We shall add
here that outside the framework of the current study, we have also conducted similar, although more
limited, ﬁeldwork on the Slovak side and the information gained from those interviews does not contradict
our argument outlined in this paper. The data allow for both qualitative and quantitative analysis, but for
the present paper and research question, it proved most useful to apply qualitative analytic techniques.
The Research Site and its Euroregions
The Komárom-Esztergom Region
Komárom-Esztergom is situated in Hungary along the Danube on the north-west border with Slovakia.
The county is divided into 76 local governments and seven micro-regions. The micro-regions were created
in the 1990s for developmental purposes and upon the realization that numerous individual local
governments were unable to effectively provide services they were required to offer. Given the massive
inﬂow of foreign investments, the regional economy has developed substantially in the 1990s and 2000s.
The bordering Slovak region of Nitra, especially the three districts (okres) adjacent to Hungary, has a
slightly different character with fewer urban centers and a regional economy relying mostly on agriculture
and food processing. Overall, the Slovak region has 350 settlements and 15 of them bear the status of
town. The three districts (or micro-regions) closest to the border have 192 settlements.5 The major urban
center of the Nitra region is the city of Nitra in the north, whereas the towns of Komárno and Štúrovo are
the largest settlements located right next to the Hungarian border.
Before World War I Komárom-Esztergom and the Nitra region were parts of a larger Hungarian-
inhabited area within the territory of “Great Hungary.” Now much of this zone belongs to Slovakia.
However, a signiﬁcant ethnic Hungarian population still lives in the Nitra region right next to the
Hungarian border. Hungarians in Komárom-Esztergom refer to the villages and towns on the other side of
the border with their original Hungarian names, for instance the town of Štúrovo is referred to as Párkány,
and the villages Zlatná na Ostrove, Sokolce and Marcelová as Csallóközaranyos, Lakszakállas and
Marcelháza, respectively. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the long-standing tensions between
Slovakia and Hungary regarding the Slovak government’s policy towards the Hungarian minority.6
However, we should note that from the perspective of local cross-border cooperation the historical past
implies that there are strong external normative forces serving both as incentives (cultural-linguistic
afﬁnity) and obstacles (conﬂicts).
Within Komárom-Esztergom there are also numerous villages that preserved their Slovak or German
character from the past: due to settlement policies during the Habsburg Monarchy, many villages of ethnic
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Slovak or German population were established in the 17th and 18th century. Currently, 10 settlements
have Slovak while 22 have German “national self-governments” in Komárom-Esztergom and, in 3 of
these, both minorities have established their own self-governments.7 Events related to the wars of the 20th
century greatly inﬂuenced the ethnic composition of many villages. Some German villages were affected
by forced migration following World War II, and some experienced an inﬂux of ethnic Hungarians from
Slovakia who were resettled within programs aiming for achieving ethnically more homogeneous
territories. It should be noted, however, that contrary to the Hungarians living in Slovakia, both the
German and Slovak minorities in Komárom-Esztergom are largely assimilated and very few of their
members use the Slovak or German language on a daily basis.
Currently,8 three cross-border initiatives operate in Komárom-Esztergom, which meet our deﬁnition of
Euroregion: the Ister-Granum EGTC, the Hídverő/Danube Association and the Pons-Danubii EGTC
(see Figure 1). These organizations are the focus of this paper. In the next subsection we brieﬂy describe
their origins and structures before we move on to analyzing them in order to establish the relation between
Figure 1. The three cross-border initiatives (Hídverő, Ister-Granum and Pons Danubii).
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their organizational goals, members’ motivations and membership structure, and capacity to act as policy
entrepreneurs.
The Euroregions
Similarly to many other cases of cross-border cooperation across Europe, the origin of the Ister-Granum
Euroregion9 is largely determined by the (re)construction of the bridge that features in its logo. For more
than half a century there was no permanent connection across the Danube between the twin cities of
Esztergom in Hungary and Štúrovo (Párkány) in Slovakia, as the major bridge—destroyed during the
Second World War—was not rebuilt due to political reasons, fully in line with the climate of distrust
described above. When, in 1999, the Slovak and Hungarian governments reached an agreement to rebuild
the bridge, it was perceived not only as the necessary precondition for setting up a regional cross-border
cooperation framework, but also as an important symbol of unity.
The ﬁrst declaration of intent to set up local cross-border cooperation was signed in 2000 by the Slovakian
Juzný micro-region and the Hungarian Esztergom-Nyergesújfalu Microregional Development
Association, which together covered 35 local governments across the border. After the preparatory stage,
the Ister-Granum Euroregion was established in 2003 with more than 100 participating local
governments from Komárom-Esztergom and the neighboring Pest region in Hungary and the Nitra
region in Slovakia. At the time, Ister-Granum covered an area of 2,200 km2 and had 220,000 inhabitants
(Eck, Jankai, and Ocskay 2007), which made it small from an international perspective. However, in
2009, when the Euroregion adopted the legal personality of an EGTC, a dozen local governments, mainly
from Slovakia, left the cooperation and its territory shrank a bit. While among the remaining members
support for re-establishing the historical contacts among the Hungarians features as an important
motivation for joining (and staying) in the cooperation, still, the dominant expectation of the local
governments was to quickly beneﬁt from ﬁnancial returns through Ister-Granum (Medve-Bálint &
Svensson 2012).
The Euroregion has a small secretariat located in the Esztergom town hall, consisting of a manager and a
couple of assistants, depending on the number of active projects. The Euroregion has been leading, or
taking part in, several project initiatives. The managing director considered the most successful projects to
date to be formulating the plans for rebuilding the bridges and the construction of ﬁsh stairs on the river
Ipoly (Ipel) and the support for the creation of a cross-border wine tourism area (Interview June 8, 2010).
The town of Esztergom has frequently subsidized Ister-Granum and is generally acknowledged as the most
important actor within the organization (Interviews with members March–August, 2010). As expressed
by the mayor of Lábatlan: “Esztergom has an important role to play ensuring that this region is held
together, so that we feel good inside it” (Interview June 2, 2010).
Although Ister-Granum is a small Euroregion in an international comparison, the Hídverő/Danube
Association is even smaller, with only 60,000 inhabitants settled over 421 km2 (Eck, Jankai, and Ocskay
2007). Cooperation dates back to the early 1990s when villages located along the Danube on both sides of
the border began to organize annual cultural events called “Hídverő napok” (“Bridge-building days”), but a
formal cross-border organization—the Danube Euroregion—was registered only in 2003. However, the
membership and territorial coverage of the Euroregion has taken several turns. The formal membership
was held together by Neszmély, the lead partner in the Tata Microregional Development Association and
by the Slovakian “Združenie Obcí Priatel’stva” or “Hídverő Társulás” (“Bridge-Building Association”) (Eck,
Jankai, and Ocskay 2007). Even though all local governments of the Tata micro-region in Hungary were
formally members, some were signiﬁcantly more active in the cooperation than others. The Euroregion
was subsequently tainted by allegations of corruption towards the mayor of Neszmély, who ﬁnally
resigned in April 2008 (Népszabadság 2008; Népszava 2008). The organization was drawn into a criminal
investigation and is, by any practical deﬁnition, defunct. However, the bonds joining the active members
did not dissolve and the immediate solution was to create an organization hybrid, a combination of a
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Slovak-registered nongovernmental organization (NGO) with ﬁve Hungarian settlements being honorary
members (Almásfüzitő, Dunaalmás, Kocs, Neszmély and Süttő). These Hungarian local governments
motivate their continued engagement by referring to the importance of enhancing the cohesion of the
ethnic Hungarian population across the border (Medve-Bálint & Svensson 2012).
The Hídverő/Danube Association is characterized as a ﬂat and slim organization. It neither maintains a
secretariat nor a webpage, but still manages to pull together well-attended monthly meetings, the location
of which rotates among the members. There is little initiative in terms of policy collaboration and project
development and, to the extent it exists, it relies on external organizations, such as regional development
agencies. However, the cooperation does provide a forum for active policy monitoring as the Hungarian
mayors, in particular, gain a close insight into the daily practices and problems of the Slovak local
governments (Interviews March 16, April 8, June 3, July 26, and August 12, 2010).
Pons Danubii, meaning “bridge over Danube” in Latin, is the latest one in the family of Euroregions in
Komárom-Esztergom. Discussions about this initiative began in 2006 among Hungarian towns that were
close to the border, and whose mayors aimed to strengthen bonds with Slovakia, but at the same time did
not want to succumb to the leadership of Esztergom within the Ister-Granum Euroregion. Unlike the
Ister-Granum and the Hídverő/Danube Euroregions, the motivation to reunite the Hungarian people
played a less pronounced role in determining the coverage of the Euroregion. Instead, the key actors focus
on economic development and try to gain better access to European funds (Medve-Bálint and Svensson
2012). In order to de-emphasize Hungarian ownership of the project, the six members10 decided that they
would register the initiative in the form of an EGTC in Slovakia and that Komárno would serve as the
administrative center.11 The EGTC was registered in December 2010, and is currently developing its
working structures (Interviews June 7, June 16 and August 30, 2010).
The Observed Differences and Their Possible Causes
The three Euroregions and their constitutive elements, the local governments in our study, have been
subjects in equal measure to a set of external factors usually thought to inﬂuence the development of
Euroregions. First and foremost, local and regional actors here, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern
Europe, realized that the European Union promoted cross-border cooperation initiatives, and allocated
ﬁnancial resources for this purpose. In addition, many transnational entities, such as the Association of
European Border Regions (AEBR), did advocacy work in favor of cross-border cooperation and examples
of other similar initiatives were also there to follow. Hence, there have been both external material and
normative incentives promoting the institutionalization of Euroregions in Komárom-Esztergom. In
addition, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity across the border also appeared as a further incentive or
catalyzing factor. There was also no shortage of policy problems—not the least the general need for
economic development—that could have been favorably addressed through cross-border cooperation.
This is true even if local constraints, such as the lack of necessary ﬁnancial, human, and technical
resources, might have overshadowed the opportunities for joint interventions through cross-border
cooperation.
Since the three Euroregions studied in this paper were created within a short time period and are situated
along a limited part of a single state border, this signiﬁcantly reduces the variation that might still exist in
terms of ﬁnancial resources, local policy problems or linguistic and ethnic particularities. In fact, our
analysis shows no differences among the members of the three Euroregions in terms of perceived
immediate policy problems or current ﬁnancial constraints. Still, there is a striking diversity among the
Euroregions in terms of what they are, and what they want to become. As this variation cannot be
accounted for by the above factors, we have to look for other explanations at the local level. In the next
section we ﬁrst discuss the similarities and differences of the three Euroregions regarding their level of
institutionalization and functioning and then we analyze the possible explanatory factors responsible for
the differences.
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The Outcome: Euroregions as Policy Entrepreneurs
The study seeks to identify those factors that may inﬂuence the capacity of Euroregions to act as policy
entrepreneurs. Perkmann (2007b) operationalized policy entrepreneurship as organizational development,
diversiﬁcation of resource base and appropriation of cross-border cooperation activities. We have
previously worked with the notions of institutionalization to refer to the extent to which the Euroregion
has formalized its operation, which roughly corresponds to organizational development in Perkmann’s
understanding. By appropriation of cross-border activities we mean whether it has become a major vehicle
for its members in terms of policy coordination and cooperation, and what scope and type of activities and
projects the Euroregion has undertaken.
In terms of the level of organizational development, Ister-Granum has the most formalized operation,
which also follows from the requirements of establishing an EGTC. It collects membership fees, holds
regular assemblies, and has a governing senate and thematic working groups and a secretariat responsible
for day-to-day management. Although Pons Danubii has been registered as an EGTC only recently,12 it
still has a developed institutional structure with a functioning secretariat and a recently elected director
responsible for the daily management. In contrast, Hídverő has little in terms of organizational
structure, lacking, for instance, a secretariat and a website. It is very loosely institutionalized as its
only formal attributes are the elected presidency (in 2011 the mayor of Patince performed this role) and
the rotating monthly meetings. The Hungarian participating members are only honorary members, as
the Slovak legal form that is used as a basis for operation does not allow for the formal inclusion of
foreign members. The members of the Hídverő are to a great extent loyal to its perceived mission
and working procedures, i.e. the monthly meetings. Although true policy coordination has not
developed in any of the Euroregions, it should also be noted that Hídverő does not even have such
aspirations. As for Ister-Granum, most of the interviewees claimed that communication between the
secretariat and the members is rather one-sided, although at the same time few members take an active
part in shaping the Euroregion. Projects are approved by the regular assembly meetings, but are usually
initiated by Esztergom. Pons Danubii is yet to develop its policy coordination mechanisms, although
plans about strengthening economic cooperation have already been formulated (Interview, August 30,
2010).
Securing European funds is an important goal for both Ister-Granum and Pons Danubii; however, the
members of Hídverő rather consider it an extra bonus if some of their members secure funding through
this source. All in all, Ister-Granum has the most diversiﬁed resource base, as the town of Esztergom has
also contributed substantially to its operations.
Regarding appropriation of cross-border activities, Ister-Granum has actively applied for funds and
engaged in relatively costly activities, as described above, whereas Hídverő has not pursued this at all. Pons
Danubii has yet to demonstrate its functional capacities although the successful and relatively smooth
establishing of the EGTC may provide a good start for the cooperation.
Differences in Inputs: Motivational Background, Expectations, Power Relations, and
Organizational Goals
In the previous section we brieﬂy described to what extent the three Euroregions have developed into
policy entrepreneurs. Now we turn to those factors that may determine these outcomes. First, we
analyze the differences and similarities in the motivational background and the expectations of the
members of the three Euroregions. The reasons why local governments decided to join them show
signiﬁcant variation across but not within the Euroregions. Although administrative embeddedness
played an important role in each case (those local governments that belong to the same sub-regional
entity were more likely to join a cross-border initiative together), the stated motivations for joining
vary across the Euroregions to a great extent, but much less so among the members of a single
Euroregion.
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Members of Hídverő are primarily motivated by maintaining and nurturing the common Hungarian
heritage and identity. They expect that cooperation helps to reinforce Hungarian identity across the
border and will facilitate cultural exchange between Hungarians living on both sides. As the mayor of
Süttő expressed it, “We did this for the sake of the Hungarians in Slovakia. The Euroregion can help a lot
to maintain and nurture the historical roots, to make sure that this connection continues to live and builds
up, and does not break.” Although the by-laws of the Slovak-registered organization states that the
organization is set up to protect the interest of its members and solve common problems (Statutes, Article
II), a key sentence is included at the end of Article II: “The Association can work together with towns and
settlements of other regions in the country and abroad, too.”
Although this ethnically grounded motivation often appeared in interviews with mayors of Ister-Granum,
in their case this view was nearly always accompanied by more materialistic expectations towards the
cooperation. Most of the mayors were open about their expectations towards direct material gains for their
settlements arising from the involvement in Ister-Granum. This sentiment was echoed by the
management of Ister-Granum, emphasizing local economic development as the primary aim of the
initiative (Interview June 8 and November 24, 2010). These mixed motivations can be illustrated by
contrasting the statement that “Hungarians on the other side of the border need this” (Nyergesújfalu
mayor, August 4, 2010) with the statement that “we saw some opportunities and fantasy in this—best
practice exchanges and building connections, perhaps there is something in it for us as well” (Máriahalom
mayor, Interview August 4, 2010). According to the statutes the focus of the Ister-Granum Euroregion is
almost exclusively on economic (and social) development. Article I lays down that the emphasis is on “the
full range of regional development activities … for promoting and strengthening economic and social
cohesion.” The text leaves no doubt about where resources for this development should come. The
statutes specify that “the speciﬁc objective of the Grouping” is “that by the co-ﬁnancing of the European
Union” the economic and social cohesion should be achieved. Thus, curiously, the rationale for the
organization would not exist if the European Union did not provide funding for cross-border cooperation.
Pons Danubii is the Euroregion that most visibly seeks to become such a vehicle that would enable greater
access to development grants offered by the European Union. “Every local government wants to show
itself, and we thought this could have mutual advantages. It was important for application purposes. You
can reach real achievements only through cooperation” (Komárom mayor, June 16, 2010). “EGTC
offered such an opportunity that when there is something important for the people living here, they do not
have to turn to the government, but can turn directly to Brussels” (Tata mayor, August 30, 2010).
The expectations of the members are, therefore, closely related to the reasons that motivated their joining.
Pons Danubii identiﬁed economic development as its dominant organizational goal and the members
uniformly internalized this aim. It is too early to tell whether the strong anticipation of ﬁnancial beneﬁts
will backﬁre on the cooperation if it is unable to deliver the desired results. The expectations of the
members of Ister-Granum about future ﬁnancial returns have mostly been unfulﬁlled. The growing
discontent has triggered tension and evoked conﬂicts inside the organization: many members stopped
attending the assembly meetings and some withheld the membership fees. As for the case of Hídverő, it is
doubtful whether the stated support for the Hungarian “cause” has, indeed, been fulﬁlled. However,
Hídverő members are convinced that the cooperation helped developing closer ties between the
Hungarians in Slovakia and in Hungary and their overall evaluation of the cooperation is rather positive.
Regarding the membership structure and the power relations that arise from it, the role of the
organizational goals has to be examined ﬁrst. At the time of establishing Ister-Granum, the founding
members formulated the goals of restoring historical ties across the two sides of the border and of
enhancing economic development of the entire border area under the leadership of Esztergom and
Štúrovo. Given that the organizational goals implied a relatively wide territorial coverage, most local
governments in the broad neighbourhood that identiﬁed with these goals joined the cooperation. As
Ister-Granum’s membership grew in numbers, asymmetric power relations between the lead partners,
Esztergom and Štúrovo, and the other members have become more and more visible as well.
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Power asymmetries to this extent are missing from Hídverő and Pons Danubii as they both lack a
dominant actor. While both organizations have a limited number of members, their socio-economic
characteristics are also similar: 18 small and middle-sized villages form Hídverő and 6 small towns
compose Pons Danubii. Although Hídverő in spirit is open to new members, there are technical obstacles
to extending its membership. On the one hand, the Slovak law does not allow for Hungarian settlements
to join the association formally (which is a registered NGO in Slovakia), on the other hand, the by-laws of
the organization contain the exact list of members and any changes involves restarting the whole
registration process. Since it is possible to promote the ethnic cohesion of Hungarians in other forms, too,
Hídverő’s membership has not grown. In the case of Pons Danubii, it was the ﬁrm purpose of the
founding members to have a homogeneous membership structure and a limited membership of towns of
similar size. For instance, they intentionally did not invite Tatabánya, which is the biggest city in
Komárom-Esztergom, as its inclusion would have created power asymmetries similar to those in Ister-
Granum (Interview August 30, 2010).
In the end, both Hídverő and Pons Danubii have remained small cooperative organizations with rather
homogeneous membership structures lacking explicit power asymmetries among their members. In
contrast, Ister-Granum is characterized by a number of internal conﬂicts. This is due both to the relatively
large number of actors involved and the perceivedmismatch between the stated organizational goals and the
activities pursued. The abstention of several former members from the Ister-Granum EGTC was only one
sign of these internal conﬂicts. Most mayors that expressed their discontent referred to the lack of projects
directly beneﬁting their settlements. On the one hand, this makes them passive in the organization, on the
other hand their passivity may not generate projects from which their settlement could beneﬁt.
Development of Policy Entrepreneurship Capacity
We argue that the organizational goals, initially deﬁned by the founders of the cross-border initiatives,
inﬂuence both their membership structure and the motivational background of the members. The
membership structure then directly translates into internal power relations, while the motivational
background determines the expectations of the members towards the cooperation. Immediately after the
Euroregion is established, the interaction between these three factors (organizational goals, expectations,
membership structure) will jointly determine the future capacity for policy entrepreneurship (Figure 2).
Once the Euroregion becomes active, the members experience how the initially stated goals and their own
expectations become fulﬁlled. In case the membership structure allows for dominant or more powerful
Figure 2. Factors determining policy entrepreneurship capacity.
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actors to emerge, on the one hand operations may become conﬂictual, on the other hand, the scope and
type of projects carried out may not satisfy all the members, even if they are in line with the stated goals.
Some Polish–German Euroregions are examples of such outcomes (Osekowski 2000). The perceived
discrepancy between the original expectations and the membership experience further raises internal
conﬂicts, which may lead to the deterioration of the cooperation through signiﬁcantly decreased activity of
the unsatisﬁed members, as is the case with Ister-Granum. However, if the experience and initial
expectations of the members meet each other over time, then that leads to their sustained, active
commitment to the initiative, for which Hídverő provides an example.
We further argue that Euroregions aiming to promote cultural cohesion and identity, which are usually
low-cost activities, are less likely to be characterized by conﬂictual operation. However, those Euroregions
that emphasize the promotion of economic development as their primary goal are more likely to invite
members that expect direct material beneﬁts. On the one hand, this implies engaging in more costly
activities; on the other hand, internal conﬂicts are also more likely to emerge once ﬁnancial and economic
interests are involved. Table 1 offers a general overview of the main characteristics of the three
Euroregions.
Table 1. The main characteristics of the three Euroregions
Ister-
Granum
Hídverő/
Danube
Pons
Danubii
General
characteristics
Total number of members (local
governments)
89 18 6
Established in (year) 2003 2003 2009
Common ethnic background of the members Yes Yes Yes
Current sub-regional administrative ties
connecting the members
Yes Yes No
Territorial coverage Contiguous Non-contiguous Non-contiguous
Organizational goals Aspiration to strengthen the ethnic cohesion
of Hungarians
Yes Yes No
Aspiration to secure external funding Yes No Yes
Membership structure Socio-economic character of the members Dissimilar Similar (villages) Similar (towns of
similar size)
Power asymmetry among members Yes No No
Motivational
background
Dominant expectation of members Direct material
beneﬁts
Strengthening ties
with ethnic
Hungarians
Direct material
beneﬁts
Functioning Scope and type of activities in line with the
stated organizational goals
Yes (partially) Yes N.A.
Characterized by internal conﬂicts Yes No No
Policy
entrepreneurship
capacity
Level of formalized operations
(organizational development)
High Low Medium
Appropriation of cross-border cooperation
activities (extent of policy coordination and
cooperation across various ﬁelds)
Low Low Low
Diversiﬁcation of resource base Medium Low Low
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While Hídverő is characterized by a homogeneous membership structure and organizational goals that
imply engagement in low-cost activities, Ister-Granum is highly diverse in terms of its membership and
adopted broad, ambitious, and costly organizational goals. Although Hídverő’s level of institutionalization
remained low, it is functioning smoothly to the extent of its initially stated purposes. In contrast, even
though Ister-Granum has established a solid institutional structure and carried out activities that comply
with its original aspirations, its functioning is contested internally by some of the members.
Still at the beginning of its operations, Pons Danubii seems to be a mixture of Hídverő and Ister-
Granum: its organizational goals and the members’ motivational background are similar to that of Ister-
Granum but its membership structure resembles that of Hídverő. In terms of institutionalization, Pons
Danubii still has to develop a fully-ﬂedged system but it has already outperformed Hídverő in this
respect. Unlike Ister-Granum, it did so without the presence of internal conﬂicts and tensions. The
question now is whether Pons Danubii will take the path of Ister-Granum in the future or rather that of
Hídverő. Given the small number of its members and their homogeneity, internal power asymmetries
may not arise even in the long run but engaging in costly activities as prescribed by the organizational
goals may eventually lead to conﬂicts that could backﬁre on the organization. What will determine this
is most probably whether the experience of the members will match their initial expectations about the
cooperation.
Concluding Remarks
Our inquiry has been guided by the assumption that delimitations and emergence of border regions and
their accompanying cross-border initiatives are neither unproblematic nor self-evident. We have
previously demonstrated the complexities behind both the Euroregions’ capacity to attract local
governments and the local governments’ decisions to join them (Medve-Bálint and Svensson 2012). The
aim of this paper has been to go beyond this and look into the functioning of these initiatives. The study
constitutes an effort to shed light on how Euroregions become what they are, and what may inﬂuence
where they are going.
Within a small border region we found empirical evidence for the diversity of cross-border initiatives in
terms of their capacity to act as policy entrepreneurs and how this could be attributed to two contrasting
ways of entering the cooperation: one that focuses primarily on the economic dimension and one for
which common ethnic roots are considered more important. In addition, our study bears policy relevance
in that it shows that setting too ambitious or too vaguely formulated organizational goals for cross-border
initiatives may lead to getting the membership “wrong.” This, over time, may result in the disintegration
of such initiatives, which, from a broad perspective, could also damage the European cross-border policy
agenda.
All things considered, we believe that the study may be of value for further research both due to its
hypothesis-generating capacity and policy relevance. Comparative research involving several border
regions, or a contrasting case study from another part of Central and Eastern Europe would constitute
valuable steps towards testing the above suggested causal mechanism and the underlying policy processes.
Endnotes
1 The ﬁrst article in the Journal of Borderlands Studies on cross-border cooperation in Europe (Scott 1993)
dealt exclusively with Western Europe and saw developments primarily in the light of the introduction of
the Single European Market and changing European regional policy. Special issues of the journal paid
more attention to the developments in CEE (JBS 15 (1) 2000 and 20 (2) 2005).
2 The deﬁnition builds on Perkmann’s description of Euroregions as “more or less institutionalized
collaboration between contiguous subnational authorities across national borders” (Perkmann 2002, 104).
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3 Celata and Coletti (2008) build their analysis on documents related to the 2000–2006, and 2007–2013
programming period of the European Union. The quote is from an English version published online. An
extended version was published in Italian in 2011.
4 NUTS (“Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics”) is the territorial statistical system of the
European Union. In this paper we deal with the NUTS 3 level regions and with local governments as the
lowest level of state administration, represented by theNUTS 5 or LAU 2 (Local Administrative Unit) level.
5 Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/local_administrative_
units (accessed February 1, 2013).
6 In 2009 tensions centered around a controversial Slovak language law that, among other things, aimed at
enforcing increased use of Slovak geographic names. For somewhat longer reﬂection on the issue, see:
http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/36140/2/hungary_continues_to_criticise_slovak_language_law.
html (accessed September 8, 2009).
7 Information provided by the German and Slovak National Self-governments (2010).
8 The Vág-Duna-Ipoly Euroregion (established in 1999), which was a cooperation at the regional level
(between Nitra county in Slovakia and Komárom-Esztergom and Fejér counties in Hungary) without
involving local governments, has long ago terminated its activity. An overly optimistic scholarly assessment
of this Euroregion in this journal (Dancs et al. 2000) shows the perils of making too early evaluations
about the functioning of cross-border initiatives.
9 As it is the case with numerous Euroregions, a Latin name was chosen to avoid giving preference to the
Hungarian or the Slovak language. In this case Ister refers to the Danube, and Granum to the Garam river.
10 Three on the Hungarian side (Komárom, Kisbér and Tata), and three on the Slovak side: Kolárovo
(Gúta), Komárno (Révkomárom) and Hurbanovo (Ógyalla).
11 While Pons-Danubii fulﬁls our deﬁnition of a Euroregion (a formalized cooperation initiative between
subnational authorities in adjacent European countries), it does not form a geographically cohesive
territory due to the deliberate exclusion of smaller settlements located in the neighborhood of the six
towns. For a discussion at length on the crucial issue of whom to include (and exclude) in the formation
process of the Euroregion, see Medve-Bálint and Svensson (2012).
12 http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/en-US/news/Pages/PonsDanubii.aspx (accessed April 2, 2011).
13 Answers subsequently approved by the mayor after an interview with an administrative ofﬁcial on the
indicated date at the premises of the local government.
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Appendix: Interviews
Almásfüzitő: Lukács Karánsebesy, August 12, 2010 (via phone)
Annavölgy: József Bánhidi, April 9 2010 (in person)
Bajna: Tibor Pallagi, August 3, 2010 (via phone)
Bajót: Zoltán Tóth, July 20, 2010 (via phone)
Csolnok: József Bérces, August 4, 2010 (in person)
Dág: Tamás Steiner, May 18 2010 (in person)
Dömös: Lajos Novák, May 19, 2010 (in person)
Dunaalmás: Péter Lévai, July 26, 2010 (via phone)
Epöl: Imre Muszela, July 26, 2010 (via phone)
Esztergom: Tamás Meggyes, June 3, 2010 (in person)13
Kesztölc: Lajos Gaál, June 11, 2010 (in person)
Kisbér: Dr Erzsébet Udvardi, June 7, 2010 (in person)
Kocs: Bódis Jánosné, April 8, 2010 (in person)
Komárom: János Zatykó, June 16, 2010 (in person)
Lábatlan: István Török, June 3, 2010 (in person)
Leányvár: János Tóth, June 16, 2010 (in person)
Máriahalom: Kálmán Murczin, August 4, 2010 (in person)
Mogyorósbánya: Tibor Havrancsik, August 24, 2010 (via phone)
Nagyigmánd: Ferencné Szijj, August 4, 2010 (via phone)
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Naszály: István Maszlavér, April 12, 2010 (in person)
Neszmély: Béla Horváth, June 3, 2010 (in person)
Nyergesújfalu József Miskolczi, August 4, 2010 (in person)
Piliscsév: Mária Nagy, August 2, 2010 (via phone)
Pilismarót: László Benkovics, May 19, 2010 (in person)
Sárisáp: Károly Kollár, August 3, 2010 (via phone)
Süttő: János Czermann, March 16, 2010 (in person)
Tát: Lajos Szenes, May 19, 2010 (in person)
Tata: József Michl, August 30, 2010 (in person)
Tokod: Mihály Pánczél, March 11, 2010 (in person)
Tokodaltáró: József Petrik, June 7, 2010 (in person)
Úny: József Pósfai, July 28, 2010 (via email)
Manager of Ister-Granum EGTC: István Ferencsik, June 8, 2010
Former manager of Ister-Granum EGTC: Gyula Ocskay, November 24, 2010
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